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ABSTRACT
This paper is an analysis of the foreign policy of John 
Quincy Adams from .1814 to 1829 in terms of the ideas of the 
English philosopher John Locke.
Its main contention is that Locke influenced the think­
ing of Adams as he formulated such policies9 whose purpose was 
to bring about a world order which both suited American 
national interests and satisfied a world-view greatly resem­
bling that of Locke.
This world-view emphasized rationality, which wove a 
fine balance between pragmatism and morality. It had as its 
basis knowledge, perception, action, and belief in the effi­
cacy of property, all being made to intellectually interact to 
produce views marked by both fairness and a sense of histori­
cal inevitability.
Adams applied these precepts throughout his career as 
chief American negotiator of the Treaty of Ghent, Minister to 
Great Britain, Secretary of State, and finally, President of 
the United States.
He maintained these principles throughout, when dealing 
with Britain over issues arising from the War of 1812, and 
over Oregon, trade, and boundary disputes; when dealing with 
Spain over American expansion and the Latin American repub­
lics; when dealing with France, Russia, and Greece; and when 
dealing with the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine.
The result was a series of policies which were consist­
ent, yet pragmatic.
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 
A STUDY IN LOCKEAN SYNTHESIS
INTRODUCTION
There was a remarkable resemblance in the political and 
philosophical thinking of two men who lived more than a century 
apart. One, an Englishman, John Locke, lived from 1 6 3 2 to 17041 
the other, an American, John Quincy Adams, lived from 1767  
1848. Locke was born in Wrington, Somerset, the son of an attor­
ney, and was reared in a liberal Puritan environment. He atten­
ded Oxford University, studied philosophy and medicine, and gra­
duated in 1 6 5 6. He then taught there, lecturing in Latin and 
Greek. Later, he became associated with the great scientist, 
Robert Boyle, and the great physician, Thomas Sydenham. In I667  
he became associated with the Earl of Shaftesbury as physician 
and diplomat, and in 1 6 8 3 had to flee to Holland because of 
Shaftesbury's opposition to the Stuarts. After William of Orange 
ascended the English throne in 1689, Locke returned, and in 1691 
he was invited to reside at Oates, the home of Sir Francis and 
Lady Masham. During this period, his two most important works, 
the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and the Two Treatises 
of Government, were published. He died in Oates.*
John Quincy Adams was born in Braintree, Massachusetts, 
the son of a future President of the United States and founding 
father of the Republic. He was educated both in Europe and at 
Harvard College, and in 1790 he was admitted to the bar. In 1794
he was named Minister to the Netherlands, and later he served as
2
3Minister to Prussia. In 1797 he married. He then served as a Fed­
eralist United States Senator from 1803 to 1 8 0 7, breaking with 
his party over Jefferson*s Embargo Act. Around this time he was 
also Boylston Professor at Harvard. In 1809 he was named Minister 
to Russia, and then he was chief American negotiator for the 
Treaty of Ghent which ended the War of 1812. From 1 815 to 1817 he 
was Minister to Great Britain. He then served as Secretary of 
State under President James Monroe, and was subsequently elected 
President of the United States by the House of Representatives in 
a four-way race. From 1830 until his death in l8*f8 he was a United 
States Congressman from Massachusetts. He died in Washington,
D.C. 2
Despite these national and temporal differences, the ideas 
of the two men resembled one another greatly, particularly in 
regard to government and the self. This is particularly evident in 
the following concepts: (1) The state as a condition of moral 
order; (2) The self as defined by consciousness; (3) The self as 
thought and action; (^) The production of property as the definer 
of self; and (5) Knowledge as a state of being certain.-^
Nowhere was the manifestation of these concepts more appar­
ent than in Adams' career, first as a diplomat, and then as Pres­
ident of the United States. This paper will outline the salient 
conceptual influences on that career, and that career itself, 
from 1814 to 1829» when he was, in turn, chief American negotia­
tor at Ghent, Minister to Great Britain, Secretary of State, and 
President of the United States. During this time, he united a 
life of contemplation and a life of action, being the quintessen­
tial embodiment of Lockean action in his negotiations with the 
Spanish over Florida; his formulation of the Monroe Doctrine; his 
efforts at insuring that the United States would eventually 
acquire the Oregon Territory; and his Presidential dealings with 
various European and Latin American nations in regard to trade, 
national sovereignty, and other matters. By his actions in these 
areas, Adams synthesized the political, the philosophical, and 
the pragmatic, and integrated them into his thinking about inter­
national relationships. In doing this, he developed and brought 
to bear certain formative influences and realized a profound 
individuality.
FORMATIVE INFLUENCES
The Rationalisn of Locke and Others As Influences
on John Quincy Adams
John Quincy Adams* ideas had a particular continuity with
those of his father, one of the founders of the American Republic,
and John Adams was an avid student of Locke, the philosopher whose
understanding of politics most influenced the thinking of the
Founding Fathers.^What is more, John Quincy Adams was part of an
intellectual environment which was permeated with the influence of 
7
Locke, an influence from which both Federalists and anti-Federal-
8ists drew guidance. For example, John Adams insisted that he and
his contemporaries were concerned with establishing a new and
purified type of political community which would be founded upon,
o
among other things, Christianity and Lockean precepts, and thus
10his library contained volumes of Locke. Moreover, John Adams fur­
ther insisted that the works of the great political philosophers,
such as Locke, Milton, Sidney, and Harrington would convince any
11candid mind that a republican form of government was best.
Moreover, the mind of John Quincy Adams was very receptive,
as he early on took pride in the accomplishments of the American
Revolution and the Republic, and was very precocious, applying
himself to more serious matters than those which a very young man,
12even in his day, would normally occupy himself with. As an indica­
tion of this receptivity, one may cite the emphasis which he would
5
6later place upon natural law. This can be traced back through his 
father, and thence back to John Locke. However, his father was 
not the only avenue of transmission of this influence. In the 
larger environment, Locke's ideas were passed into the general 
discourse in New England by way of pamphlets, newspapers, and 
sermonst
Subsequently, John Quincy Adams accompanied his father to 
Europe, where he cultivated a voracious appetite for books, which 
he collected at least from 1779*^After his return to the United 
States, he entered Harvard College, where he was further exposed
16to Locke, having to endure a rigorous examination on the subject. 
Its library also included Locke, as well as Algernon Sidney, Har­
rington, and others whom its benefactor, Thomas Hollis, hoped
would imbue the Harvard students with a devotion to free consti-
17tutional government.(It is interesting to note that Adams acknow­
ledged that Harvard introduced him to all the prosperity that 
ever befell him***
Later, John Quincy Adams' explicit references to Locke are 
not numerous, but they are quite trenchant. The following are 
examples of such references:
(1) Concerning Locke's denial of innate ideas: He appears to rea­
son in such a manner that I am very much inclined to think 
him right.19
(2) You have learnt from Mr. Locke, that all human ideas are 
ultimately derived from one of two sources? either from 
objects perceptible to the senses, or from the reflections of 
our own minds upon such objects. It is equally clear that 
language, the purpose of which is to communicate our ideas, 
must be composed of words, the first drawn from ideas of sen­
sation. 20
(3) In an address to his constituents in 18^2, Adams defended
7Locke and Sydney against Filmer and Hobbes, contending that 
the consent of society needed to institute a valid govern­
ment is part of the constitution of society.21
(4) When the question of the separation of powers was uppermost 
in Congressional discussions, Adams went straight to Locke, 
for he regarded him as the true originator of the theory.22
What is more, Locke was the prototypical rational man, and John 
Quincy Adams placed particular importance upon the type of rea­
son that deals with abstraction and theory as the source of an 
understanding of life?^This was true in foreign affairs, as well 
as in other endeavors.
However, there was more than the influence of Locke here. 
-Adams was the product of the eighteenth century, and therefore 
manifested many of the intellectual trends and traditions of 
that century. What is more, he believed that the study of law,
supported by wide reading in history and politics, offered the
24best training for public service and high office. Therefore, as
Secretary of State, he recommended Grotius, Vattel, and Montes-
2<
quieu as theoretical foundations of foreign policy. In addition, 
he studied Burlamaqui at Harvard and had his works in his lib- 
rary. Adams was also a lifetime admirer of Cicero.
A study of such writers would tend to reinforce a world 
view imbued with rationalism, order, and balance; one which com­
bined the moral and the pragmatic. The following examples of 
their thinking illustrate this:
(1) Grotius maintained that natural law was the basis for legis­
lation for countries as well as for individuals, and he advocated 
respect for life and the ownership of property.28
(2) Vattel stated that respect which others had for the rights of 
domain and property constituted the security of our actual pos­
sessions, and that there must be a balance of power in order to
8
control the authority of aggressive states.29
(3) Montesquieu examined monarchy, republic, and despotism, and 
espoused a balance of powers in government and a separation of 
authority. 3°
(4) Burlamaqui believed in natural law and its relationship to 
God, human intellect, and innate moral responses, and considered 
natural law to be the foundation of domestic and international 
law. 31
(5) Cicero was the moral philosopher of Rome, and a practical 
guide to the good life. 32
What is more, all his life, John Quincy Adams was also devoted 
to the works of Aristotle, Virgil, Plutarch, Erasmus, Pope, Bol- 
ingbroke, Lord Kames, and Jefferson, which upheld the belief 
that there was a moral order in the universe? that the community 
of man should live within that order? and that government was 
established with that end in mind?-^
The writings of these thinkers, therefore, provided a firm 
conceptual reinforcement for Adams' rationalist tendencies.
These tendencies were reflected in his desire that his policies 
be judged by their standards of propriety, accuracy in reflect­
ing international conditions, and possible contribution to the
3k
nation's well-being.
The Anglophobia of John Quincy Adams
Counterpoised to these rationalist influences was one that 
was pre-eminently irrationals Adams' Anglophobia. He revealed it 
early on, as negative references to the British abound in his 
letters and other sources. For example, in a letter of April 12, 
1794 to his father, which was written from the Netherlands, 
where he was American Minister, he stated that "the general dis­
9position of the French ruling powers has been constantly favora­
ble to us, and the British government, acrimonious, jealous and
35
under the giuse of fair pretensions, deeply malignant.” It was a 
fear and distrust which could perhaps only have arisen out of a 
sense of betrayal, as Britain transgressed the orderly and 
abstract reality of balance and social contract which Adams had 
envisioned. There was, perhaps, even a feeling akin to that of a 
child having discovered, at last, that his parents were not per­
fect. It manifested itself in a concern about the special rela­
tionship between Britain and rebellious governments, taking the 
forms of both ideology and commerce, as well as power relation­
ships as such?^
For example, again while he was American Minister to the 
Netherlands, Adams wrote very disapprovingly of the British con­
trol over the Dutch government, lamenting its unwillingness to
37negotiate with France?'He even condemned the British national
38
character, considering them an "object of aversion.” He applau­
ded any British setback, and he condemned the supposed British 
efforts to aggrandize themselves^Therefore, he would gleefully 
anticipate a decline in British power. Because of this, he 
looked with favor upon the British war with Napoleon, believing 
that a few more years of peace in America and war in Europe 
would so bankrupt and exhaust Britain that all her possessions 
in the New World would fall to the United States.
On a more theoretical level, Adams believed that the 
dependence of the American colonies upon Great Britain was a 
"dependence of parchments of proclamations unsanctioned by the
10
41
laws of nature, disavowed by the dictates of reason.” Again, 
this transgressing of natural law was the theme of another 
utterance* "Britain, inspired by the shibboleth, ’Rule Britan­
nia! Britannia rule the waves!', foisted upon the world a jus­
tice in maritime matters widely divergent from the requirements
42
of natural justice.”
His antipathy could even approach the concept of a Mani- 
chean dualism. For example, Adams stated, "Unconditional surren­
der to British overlordship would be anathema”j or "The combined 
purpose of all other commercial nations should be to counteract 
this overwhelming power of Britain." Such feelings could reach
such a level of intensity that he sometimes invoked scriptural
44injunction to show America's right in relation to Britain.
In short, the Anglophobia of John Quincy Adams was based 
upon a combination of empirical, emotional, and theoretical fac­
tors. One must understand this in analyzing his actions towards 
Britain while he was a diplomat, Secretary of State, and Presi­
dent of the United States.
THE DIPLOMAT AS A LOCKEAN ACTING PERSON
John Quincy Adams is considered perhaps the most accom­
plished diplomat in American history. What is more, he had a 
considerable talent for abstract theory and its practical appli-
h,Z
cation to American nationalism.JHe therefore accomplished his 
tasks by gathering multitudes of empirical data for use in gov­
ernmental decisions, and then subjecting it to the most rigorous
46analytical processes. With the ideas, or mixed modes, formulated 
from this effort he produced courses of action involving deal­
ings with Great Britain, France, Russia, Spain, and other coun­
tries, both in regard to the continental expansion of the United 
States, and in regard to the maintainance or establishment of 
American rights in more non-contiguous areas such as Latin Amer­
ica and the British West Indies. This integrated process 
involved the choosing of ideas, and their subjection to a pro­
cess of free variation which, according to Locke, are a series 
of relations, of simple ideas conflated in different ways. The 
fashioning of the mental structures which are the product of 
this process is a function of consciousness, which is the pri­
mary quantity which defines the self. Intimately related to this 
is the Lockean concept of freedom as power, or the ability to
bring into significant effect the concepts arising from that 
47consciousness.1
The acting out of these concepts involved complex efforts
11
12
which were integrated by a conceptual model of the international 
environment whieh was quite Lockean. It involved the concept of 
moral order, which Adams first applied to the United States. He 
regarded America as a unique social compact which had its gene­
sis in the Declaration of Independence. Furthermore, he regarded 
the United States as the first nation in the world which derived 
its principles from the laws of nature, and as a “moral person” 
(an entity acting in conformance with those laws) in the family 
of nations. He juxtaposed this unique compact, m  which men 
lived in harmony with each other and exercised their rational 
thinking abilities in order to maximize individual happiness, 
with the relationships of nations to each other. This individual 
happiness could only be possible within an environment of free­
dom and individual initiative. In the international.arena, this 
was the state of nature, in which nations lived according to 
their own laws, and recognized no others. In such a situation 
force would inevitably have to be used in order to protect human 
freedoms. Because of this inevitable possibility, Adams believed
that a strong militia and navy were necessary for the protection
49of the United States against aggression. Locke, too, realized 
that men engaged in the social compact would not long be secure 
in that interaction of relationships without external means of 
assuring it. Therefore, in creating an environment of security 
in which war would be unnecessary, he considered foreign policy 
to be the ultimate determinant of the structure of society^°This 
line of thinking reveals a degree of pragmatism which marked the 
actions of both men.
13
Adams also discerned the basic importance of foreign
policy. To him, war would only be the last resort when the ideas
resulting from reasoned consideration could not go into effect.
Before such a calamitous occurrence, every reasonable man should
be aware that rational statesmen would abide by international
law, and that this awareness would be an important integrating
idea of the nature of society, and of the international order in
general. This belief was a guiding idea in John Quincy Adams'
diplomatic efforts. As a case-in-point concerning this belief,
there is an 1806 address, where Adams, as a United States
Senator, stated in Congress: "Ministers are the only instruments
by which war is averted when it approaches, or terminated, and
51
this consideration surrounds their sanctity." Similarly, there
is an 1823 letter of instruction to Benjamin Rush, United States
Minister to Great Britain: "The policy of the United States,
with reference to foreign nations, has always been founded upon
<2the principle of natural law, peace with all mankind.
Nevertheless, seeking to achieve or maintain peace while 
being concomitantly armed for war did represent something of a 
moral dilemna which Adams must have found difficult to resolve. 
One must explain this apparent contradiction in terms of the 
richness of ideas which he had at his command due to his varie­
gated background of education and experience, and how this was 
intimately related to his personal freedom, or freedom of 
action. According to Locke, the existence of the nature of 
things circumscribes one's actions because it circumscribes 
thoughts.^That is, the constituents of external reality, because
Ik
of their discrete and relatively rigid nature, are self-limited 
in their capacity for interaction, both in situ, and in their 
susceptibility to transformation by thought. What is more, a 
nation-state such as the United States, being a "moral person", 
must consist, as a person, of the combined consciousnesses of 
all its citizens, deriving those consciousnesses from their 
environment and institutionally and culturally integrating them 
into a coherent structure called a nation, by a process of 
mutual interaction over time. This coherent structure is pre­
served over time, indeed, over the generations, by a collective 
knowledge of values, events, and other culturally shared exper­
iences congruent with what was immediately past, which was, in 
turn, known to be related to what was immediately its prece- 
dent. Such a process of national delimiting also affected the 
thinking of Adams in another way his recognition of geographic
factors as the foundation of national interests and diplomatic 
55advantage. The state was therefore the basic unit of conceptual
homogeneity in the world.
It is thus not surprising that John Quincy Adams believed
that the individual owed the exercise of all his faculties to
56the service of the nation-state. In effect, he wanted the United 
States to be a closed system of the interaction of ideas, its 
richness internally generated. He thought about this matter in 
insular terms. A portion of his 1802 address to the Massachu­
setts Charitable Fire Society is instructive: "The largest por­
tion of this Continent is united under a social compact, which 
makes its inhabitants equal fellow-citizens of one great and
15
57
growing empire." Because Adams possessed this rohust Americanism
and nationalism, but at the same time believed that "violence
and persuasion, being in their nature as opposite to each other,
58
as light and darkness, can never exist together", he wished to 
preserve that conceptual input by diplomacy, for his own edifi­
cation and, in turn, for the edification of others. The boundar­
ies of the state must not be transgressed by war, and the col­
lectively creative must not be destroyed. How conscious he was 
of this collective can be illustrated in an 1810 quotation from 
Boylston lectures at Harvard! "None of us liveth to himself, and 
as we live to our families, by the intercourse of more intimate 
society and mutual good offices, so we live to our country, and 
to mankind in general, by the performance of those services, and
by the discharge of those labors which belong to the profession
59
we have chosen as the occupation of our lives." By this effort, 
John Quincy Adams would realize his moral and intellectual, 
potential by means of the exchange of ideas and perceptions with 
other citizens of the nation-state. In turn, the existence of 
the nation-state would be continuously reinforced by the reaf­
firmation of the consciousnesses of its constituent parts. As a 
result of this, a vast increase in the richness of ideas would 
ensue, thereby progressively contributing to the general wel­
fare, or, in Adams' words, "the individual enjoyment of progres-
60
sive improvement and individual discovery". Self and state would 
therefore be intimately associated in a free and fruitful relat­
ionship.
The Lockean belief in the state as a moral person can thus
16
be equated with the person as a being defined by consciousness. 
Both would have the right to defend themselves in order to main­
tain their boundaries of individuality. Actions toward that end, 
if tending towards the preservation of that moral person, would 
be moral by implication, because such consequent action would 
be a function of the exercise of reason used to protect one's 
freedom. Locke was quite explicit about this: "The state of war 
is a state of enmity and destruction . . .; it being reasonable
and just I should have a right to destroy that which threatens
61
me with destruction." Likewise, Adams maintained: "For my part
I cannot imagine a possible state of the world for futurity in
which the United States shall not be a great naval and military
power . . . And as we have begun and made some progress in it
already, I doubt whether we shall ever have again so favorable
an opportunity for accomodating our permanent political system
62
to it as the present." This declamation was made within the con­
text of the War of 1812, but no such interpretation can be 
placed upon a statement of Adams' later years: Philosophically 
speaking, I believe that war was not a corrupter, but rather a
purifier of the moral character of man, that peace was the
63
period of corruption to the human race." Towards the end of his 
life, it seems that he had evolved an extreme manifestation of 
certain previous tendencies of his thinking. The United States 
has here become more than merely a moral person; it has become 
an empyrean entity forever beyond the corrupting influence of 
the amoral European states, or despotisms. The individual col­
lective consciousness has become, in effect, solipsistic, unin­
17
volved with the connotative differences of moral definition 
which are often a function of cultural differences.
However, many years before this aberration, Adams could 
express an attitude which could only be interpreted as a feeling 
that it would be considered a moral act for a nation to either 
live in peace with its coeval fellow nations, or to engage in 
war with one or another of them in order to protect the indivi­
duality of the collective national moral person. An 1816 letter 
to his father is illustrative of this belief:
Whatever may be the natural and necessary propensities of 
mankind to war, my special duty at present is to preach 
peace . . .  It was a war from which, if the account of 
disgrace and glory were fairly balanced, we should have 
something, but not much to boast of. May we do better the 
next timet and that we may do better, let us not be hasty 
to enter upon the contest. At the same time it is not 
'ignoble ease and peaceful sloth* that I would counsel.
An efficient revenue and a growing navy, these are the 
pillars of my peace. 64
The apparent dichotomy of feeling is evident here, in this case
involving Adams' feelings concerning Great Britain and its then
recently concluded war with the United States. Anxious for the
security of his country because he was an integral part of the
interaction of ideas that defined its collective nature, by
striving to maintain its profile of individuality, he strove to
maintain his.
It may be said that xenophobia would be a logical develop­
ment of such feelings, and so it was^It was an antipathy which 
Adams could express with crushing philosophical puissance. A 
passage from his 1821 address commemorating the signing of the 
Declaration of Independence is a good example of this Anglopho­
bia: ’’The connexion between the British government and the Amer-
18
ican people was unnatural? and it was in the moral order that it
66
should be dissolved.” This was a truly Lockean utterance, assum­
ing, as it did, the self-evidence of the moral order to men of 
reason, and the logical acts inevitably flowing from those rea­
soned perceptions.
The natural manifestations of such moral order, the defi­
nitive dissolution of the colonial bonds connecting Great Bri­
tain and the United States (and therefore the erection of a sta­
ble, mixed mode idea structure, free of empirical perturbations),
occurred with the signing of the Treaty of Ghent on December 14,
67l8l4, with the formal ratification exchange on January 8, 1815* 
Thus ended the War of 1812, "The Second American War for Inde­
pendence”, and the man who was in charge of the American side of 
the negotiations which brought this about was John Quincy Adams.
However, he was notably assisted by Henry Clay and Albert Galla- 
68tin. At Ghent, Adams could, in effect, attempt to realize his 
Lockean self, for as long as America remained subservient to 
Britain in any way (such as by continuing to acquiesce in the 
British impressment of American seamen), the structure of ideas 
defining the conscious national self would remain subservient to 
the idea of Britain as the power to invoke idea. The idea would 
exist autonomously, with virtually infinite potential to frus­
trate. It would he up to man’s reason to forego this quandary 
with solutions, and this reasoning process would be eminently 
Lockean. Its basis would lie in the belief that all ideas are
extracted from experience by reflection and sensation, and then,
69in turn, projected beyond experience. Since they exist as mental
19
structures separate from the person from whom they are derived,
or to whom they will be assimilated, it is up to man's reason to
perceive the agreement or disagreement between those ideas in
70order to produce knowledge! Again, according to Locke, knowledge
bears the same relationship to an individual as his behavior,
71character, or properties! Therefore, one's knowledge helps to 
define one's individuality. Britain, by being hostile to its 
former colonies, with its impressment of American seamen, denial 
of the entrance of American merchant vessels into the harbors of 
its West Indies colonies, continued disputes concerning the bor­
der between the United States and Canada, disputes concerning 
fishing rights off the Canadian coast, and other exactions, pro­
duced the empirical basis for the forced elimination of certain 
courses of action by the Americans. This was because the per­
ceived field of action believed by the Americans to be a legiti­
mate potential area of opportunity and national growth, was 
already occupied by adamantine British power. Locke maintained 
that action is the power to modify a substance from without, and
the power to bring into view for consideration that which is
72extrinsic, and that action depends on will! Therefore, the per­
ception of Britain as powerful and superior would preclude the 
free exercise of will due to the elimination of many of the ele­
ments of choice. If man does not act in accordance with his 
will, then his actions and the products of those actions cannot 
be considered his own. And, since his actions and products are 
an extension of himself, an alienation from one's own environ­
ment of ideas can occur, resulting in a species of identity
20
denial. This consideration is particularly important in Locke,
because he denied the legitimacy of defining personal identity
73as a merely physical persistence over time. Thus, consciousness 
and knowledge must be considered particularly important as the 
definers of such identity. At the level of the nation-state, 
this British suborning of will could result in the undermining 
of the national sense of selfhood, with the resultant paralysis 
of the ability to fashion by that will the structures of ideas 
dealing with national growth, a sense of national identity, or 
the ability to alter the environment for a peculiarly national 
purpose.
John Quincy Adams was deeply aware of this danger, and he 
therefore strove to effect the realization of American national 
identity. In bringing this about, it can be said that he ren­
dered an inestimable service to the United States by his uncom-
jL
promising stand for American rights at Ghent: Always guided by
the idea expressed in his Newburyport Oration: "In the struggle
of resistance against a common oppressor, coalesced spontane-
75
ously into one people by moral centripetal impulse", he consis­
tently rejected the British contention that the War of 1812 
annulled all previously existing treaties between the two 
nations?^
He maintained this and similar positions despite being 
caught between British arrogance, on the one hand, and his dis­
like for certain other members of the American delegation, on 
the other. Henry Clay drew Adams’ especial ire because he consi­
dered him a man who was more interested that the war should con­
21
tinue than that it should end, and perhaps a reminder to Adams 
that he was also caught in the Lockean quandary of both neces­
sary peace and necessary war?^The idea of America, held in com­
mon as a mixed mode, had to be preserved by war, as a defense 
against harm coming from foreigri quarters; yet, in order for the 
moral person of America to prosper and grow, the production of 
ideas within an ordered background had to be effected— a back­
ground which could only be brought about by peace.
Adams perceived the nature of this conceptual process. For 
example, in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory* he stated:
"The powers of the imagination are not confined to the reminis­
cence of ideas which have been admitted to the mind through the 
medium of the senses? they extend also to the combination of 
such ideas into forms different from any of the combinations of
nature. It is the union of these two powers in the faculties of
78
man, which opens a new creation to the mind." With that state­
ment he expressed the Lockean concept of the two sources of 
79ideas, and it would obviously be an intellectual synthesis of 
this type, in international affairs, which could follow a peace 
with Britain. However, the existence of an enemy nation would 
preclude the free interaction of these two types of ideas, as 
minds would be constantly drawn back to the overwhelming entity 
threatening the very dissolution of the conceptual underpinnings 
of the state. This vectoring of American minds towards a single 
predicative object would obviously preclude the interactive 
realization of intellectual potential, which Adams— and Locke—  
envisioned.
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Therefore, at Ghent, Adams would strive assiduously for a 
world in which there would not only be an absence of conflict, 
but also the perception of the absence of the potential for con­
flict. Britain he considered the chief barrier to that realiza­
tion. In his 1808 letter to Harrison Gray Otis, he stated* "The 
great obstacle which has always interfered in the adjustment of 
our differences with Britain, has been that she would not acqui­
esce in the only principle upon which fair negotiations between
independent nations can be conducted, the principle of recipro- 
80
city." In other words, John Quincy Adams wished that Great Brit­
ain would enter into the commonality of the "state of nature", 
a condition in which all sovereign states were equal, and had 
the equal right to be free from the domination of any other
Q «|
nation. This was congruent with the thinking of Locke, not only 
on the level of the nation-state, but also as it applies to the 
individual.
As an illustration of this, Adams always insisted upon 
maintaining personal dignity, not only as a representative of 
the United States, but also as a free individual who acted to 
effect the state of nature on a personal scale by seeking to 
restrain men from invading the rights of others. To this end, he 
always sought to moderate the behavior of the British negotia-
p p
tors Goulbum, Lord Gambier, and the others. However, he 
believed that his efforts were in vain. A single comment from 
his diary suffices* "The tone of all the British notes is arro­
gant, overbearing, and offensive. The tone of ours is neither so 
bold nor so spirited as I think it should be. It is too much on
23
the defensive, and too excessive in the caution to say nothing
83
irritating . . • But in this opinion I am alone." He thus main­
tained an adamantine individuality through all the sparring and 
emotional counterpoint, and through all the issues, such as 
whether the Indians should be treated as sovereign nations, or 
whether the United States was planning to conquer Canada.
Nevertheless, the treaty ending the War of 1812 was 
signed. But it left many disputes between Britain and the 
United States unresolved. They included the fixing of the boun­
daries between the United States and Canada; fishing rights on 
the Grand Banks, off the Canadian Atlantic coast; the impress­
ment of American seamen; the lack of British respect for Ameri­
can neutral rights; the right of blockade at sea; and the ques­
tion of whether Britain and the United States had the right to 
maintain naval forces on the Great Lakes?^In short, the treaty 
merely imposed a status quo ante bellunu with no improvement of 
that condition. Adams would have much to say about these ques­
tions in later years, not only in regard to the maintainance of 
the equality of nations, but also, by implication, in regard to 
property rights in their broadest, Lockean sense— as the pro­
tection of the means of sustenance.
After the conclusion of the negotiations at Ghent, Adams 
was named Minister to Great Britain by President James Madison. 
In this office he initiated conversations which were to result
in the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1 8 1 8, whereby the boundary
86
between Canada and the United States was demilitarized. He also 
constantly brought up all the other questions left outstanding
2k
by the Treaty of Ghent. In Lockean terms, such agreements were
simply conditional accords in which certain retrenchments in
the compass of action were permitted in order to allow a compa-
87rative freedom of action to both parties in separate spheres. 
Indeed, what would be involved would often be actual physical 
retreat, in this case involving military forces so as to pre­
vent violent confrontations. To Locke, therefore, freedom was
g
the ability to act or not to act, according to choice, or will.
Additionally, according to the Lockean concept of ideas being
89derived from experience, if physical freedom is circumscribed, 
the capacity of the individual to synthesize ideas from his
environment is also circumscribed. Therefore, with Adams again,
/
there would be a compelling necessity to enter into treaty 
agreements with Britain, on behalf of the United States, due to 
a congruence of Lockean political, i.e., pragmatic, and philo­
sophical determinants.
In 1817 Adams was named Secretary of State by President 
James Monroe. He brought to this office a sense of the highest 
moral standards. For example, as a United States Senator in 
1 8 0 6, he maintained that "A foreign minister does not represent
the person of his master, but only him in his affairs, and is
90
therefore not entitled to his immunities." He also brought to
this position a belief acquired from his European experiences
that neutrality was essential for the continuance of American
Constitutional union, and even independence, at that time in
91American history.
With these profound beliefs as part of his world-view,
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Adams could effect a personal Lockean synthesis of American 
foreign policy, basing it upon the concept of a world in which 
all nations engaged in reciprocal relationships as equals, none 
under the domination of another. It would be the world as the 
state of nature, but also the world as a function of enlight­
ened pragmatism. To render this idea a reality, he would engage 
himself very actively; first, by gathering empirical data as 
input for use in governmental decisions; secondly, by applying 
his great talent for diplomacy, accompanied by his native 
training and interest in this type of endeavor, to prescient 
analyses of both the internal and the diplomatic dynamics of 
European and other states. Into this alchemy of ideas and
actions he also brought his wide experience and his extensive
92background in academics, languages, and law. Here, one can
again notice the Lockean interaction between ideas, extrinsic-
ally generated, and ideas as a result of reflection upon the
properties and characteristics of the first type. This interac-
93tion produces understanding, which could range, in Adams* case,
from a discerning of British motives in their attempt to hold
onto the Oregon Territory, to an anticipation of the policies
which the European leaders were likely to pursue in regard to 
9kone another; And, he would cast wide this net of meticulous 
action. For example, his diplomatic instructions to American 
foreign service officers concerning their duties are consid­
ered to be masterful. Illustrative of this is an 1818 instruc­
tion to George Washington Campbell, American consul in Russia, 
in which Adams takes time to delineate that Campbell's duties
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are intimately related to the history of United States trade 
relations with Russia; the trading practices of the Russian 
merchants; the possible role of Russia as a naval power; and 
possible Anglo-Russian conflict in the Northwest9 all in copi-
QC
ous detail. Such meticulousness and richness of ideas truly
represented the Lockean effectuation of freedom. He could act,
and he knew his actions would have effect.
He would now apply his mind, broadcast, in an environment
where will and action could often follow each other in order to
produce change or interaction. This change could be defined by
three concepts of Lockes (1) The self as thought and action;
(2) The vital necessity for producing property; and (3) Know-
96ledge as the state of being certain.
In order to determine how Adams produced this synthesis
in his thoughts and actions between the philosophical and the
pragmatic, there will now be an analysis of one of his most
important acts as Secretary of State— the formulation of the
Monroe Doctrine. He began to formulate it as early as January,
1819, when he advocated that the United States should recognize
the new Latin American governments, and that Great Britain
97should do likewise in concert with the Americans. By this act,
which warned against European interference in Latin American
affairs (and also sought to bind Great Britain by principle so
that it would not acquire the former Spanish colonies for 
98
itself), these new republics, recently having forcefully 
severed their ties with Spain, and unused to governing them­
selves in a responsible manner, could be brought into the con-
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cert of nations.
However, the evolution of the Doctrine from its first
formulation to when it was decided upon by President Monroe in
1823 was complex, refecting its varying antecedents in thought
and action. Its first explicit statement came in a conversation
between Adams and Baron Tuyl, Russian Minister to the United
States, in which Adams stated that he expected that Russia
would not encroach upon the North American continent, and in
return, that the United States would not interfere in European 
99affairs. He would utilize this principle of the mutual exclu­
sion of national sovereignty many times in carrying out his 
plans for America’s destiny.
These plans required a seamless definition of the self as 
thought and action, or the causing to carry through of a policy 
as a direct result of intellect and will. In defining the self 
as thought and action, Locke considered action to be an active 
power which effectuates the passive power of thought by produc­
ing an effect as the active manifestation of that thought which
100
originated as an impression from something extrinsic. This 
extrinsic impression is refashioned by the mind into an entity 
which is paradigmatically derived from what produced it, but 
bears little resemblance to that. Richness of thought suid rich­
ness of action interact in a type of free variation of ideas 
and perceptions to lend the thinker a greater and greater 
degree of self-definition as will, the whole determining the 
degree of freedom one possesses. One can see how this freedom 
of action, in Adams' case, in interaction with a freedom of
28
thought derived from the multitude of ways and applications of
the paradigmatic concept of "Britain as the arrogant aggressor",
lent him an individual profile--and will--in driving through his
individual concept of the Monroe Doctrine*
An impetus for that anger which Adams possessed in regard
to the British was provided by a confidential letter from George
Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, to Richard Rush, the
American Minister to Great Britain, which suggested that a joint
Anglo-American declaration be promulgated, declaring that the
Spanish recovery of its South American colonies which had suc-
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cessfully revolted was hopeless. President Monroe apparently
favored the proposal, but Adams consistently opposed any joint
102
action with the British. He had to take into account many fac­
tors which determined his actions towards Spain, and European 
intervention would have the potential for bringing forth a sys­
tematic matrix of actions. For example, the reactionary Holy
Alliance created the spectre of European intervention in Latin
103
America in the interest of reimposing the status quo ante. At
same time, the United States was in a delicate relationship
with Spain over the question of a potential American conquest
104
of its non-revolting American colony, Cuba. Moreover, Adams was 
afraid that should the United States agree to the British pro­
posal for joint intervention, it would find itself at a dis­
tinct disadvantage because of the vastly greater British mili­
tary power. Indeed, such an intervention would probably result 
in the former Spanish colonies falling to Britain, or the 
United States, nolens volens. supporting a closed system of Bri-
29
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tish commercial imperialism in regard to Latin America.
Again, one can see how fearful Adams was that America 
would he subordinated to the exigencies of British power and 
British policy. This imperial control would obviously be detri­
mental to the development of a mature sense of freedom among 
the people of the new Latin American republics. Being politic­
ally immature, these people lacked the actuality (as opposed to 
the potentiality) of reason in their dealings with the outside 
world— and with each other. According to Locke, human freedom 
is based upon man's reason, by which he can interpret the sen­
sory information from which the richness of ideas arises, and 
discover the law of nature. This law of nature expresses the
obligation through which this freedom receives its intention 
106
and meaning. Furthermore, the people of Latin America, untu­
tored in the blessings of freedom and reason, would be awash in
107
sin, for the ultimate source of man's reason is God. Thus, the
denial of reason would take on a moral dimension, and in regard
to these emerging nations, there can be no doubt that Adams
considered their independence from this perspective. In writing
of the new South American republic of Colombia, for example, he
expressed these views:
The republic of Colombia, if permanently organized to 
embrace the whole territory which it now claims, and 
blessed with a government effectually protective of the 
rights of its people, is undoubtedly destined to become 
hereafter one of the mightiest nations of the earth.
He goes on to describe Colombia's location, resources, and
other features. Then:
But it is the man placed in a Paradise like this that
30
nature with her loudest voice exclaims, 'God to thee has 
done his part— do thine* . . . .  If the natural advanta­
ges bestowed upon the Columbian territory were to be 
improved by its inhabitants only for purposes of empire 
that which nature has bestowed as a blessing upon them 
would in its consequences prove a curse inflicted upon 
the rest of mankind#108
However, in addition to these proximately moral views,
Adams has expressed another Lockean concept. In this statement,
the beneficient use of the environment takes on a teleological
import, as he believed that the progressive improvement in the
109
condition of man was the purpose of a superintending God. And, 
intimately related to this view was the Lockean concept of prop­
erty. By property, Locke meant life, liberty, and property, in
that property is what man extracts from nature by his own
110
efforts and fashions for his own sustenance* life and liberty 
being the inevitable result. In short, it is the material result 
of the wfree variation” in which one engages with ideas as the 
definer of self. It is thus another delineator of self, of free­
dom and happiness in the individual, and of the will of God. It 
is the radius of freedom extracted from sin often reluctant envi­
ronment. This linking of reason with morality, and, in turn, 
with the obligation to beneficially improve the environment, was 
a Lockean synthesis which marked John Quincy Adams' Latin Ameri­
can policies. Two further examples of his thinking in this area 
are illustrative. The first consists of a portion of a letter to 
Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy: "But while the Government 
of the United States have thus taken every occasion offered them 
in the course of events to manifest their good wishes in favor 
of the South Americans, they have never lost sight of the obli­
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gations incumbent on them, as avowedly neutral to the contest
111
between them and Spain.” The second consists of a portion of a
letter to Joaquin de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the United
States; "It is the mere acknowledgement of existing facts, with
the view to the regular establishment with the Nations newly
formed, of those relations, political and commercial, which it
is the moral obligation of civilized and Christian Nations to
112
entertain reciprocally with one another." Moralism and pragmat­
ism were seamlessly interweaved.
The question must now arise as to how such thinking could 
be applied to the governments of these nations themselves. 
According to Locke, in the formation of the state, the indivi­
dual entered into an agreement not only to obey the government, 
but also to submit his property to the jurisdiction of that
government. But Locke stated thst governments exist as agents
113
to secure property. Therefore, governments exist not so much to 
impose restraint as to facilitate the self-individualization of 
the person as one who is defined, and whose freedom is defined 
by, the ability to accumulate property. By taking upon them­
selves the function of guarantor of property, governments thus 
obligated themselves to act in a reasonable manner, and thus in 
accordance with God's will, in order to guarantee man's intel­
lectual freedom, the power to acquire and manipulate ideas. 
Paraphrasing Locke: "If man is the creature of God, he is the 
property of God. But, he can only be the property of God if God
t
owns his body, his work, and his product, which are an exten-
lll*
sion of the person." The right to property would therefore be
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of divine origin. Moreover, because each person is a product of
God, he must preserve himself in order that such work not be
defiled. Thus, Locke called for the protection of property as
a moral imperative— property as what inheres to the individual
and, by implication, property as it comprises the totality of
the state. This state Locke defined as the exclusive right to a
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particular part of the earth's surface. Hence, from the previ­
ous argument it may be concluded that only states which protect 
property are moral states, and only moral states have a right 
to exist.
From this it may be stated that as far as Adams was con­
cerned, in order for the moral imperative to have effect, the 
sanctum sanctorum of property, protected by the state, should 
not be interfered with, and the protection of property and the 
preservation of territorial integrity were synonymous. The 
Latin American states should be left alone. He strove to put 
this policy into effect. Again, illustrative of this was his 
strenuous objection to amending a dispatch to Richard Rush con­
cerning the official reply to Foreign Secretary Canning's pro­
posal of joint Anglo-American action to protect the new Latin 
American republics. The amendment appeared to admit that the 
United States would not object to an arrangement by which spe­
cial favors, or even a restoration of authority, could possibly
be conceded to Spain. Such interference could not be allowed.
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The amendments were rejected.
With the free variation of thought and the moral impera­
tive in regard to allowing the Latin American nations to deve-
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lop unhindered depicted, it would now be appropriate to examine 
the structure of this process in Lockean terms, and to provide 
further examples of it concerning the Monroe Doctrine. The free 
variation in Adams* manipulation of ideas, in this instance, 
proceeding from a firm basis in the acute perception of rela­
tionships, was redolent of the Lockean belief in intuitive know­
ledge as the perception of the agreement or the disagreement of
two ideas, immediately by themselves, without the intervention
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of any other ideas. Such a manipulation of ideas would consist 
primarily of the analysis of the consequences of those intui­
tively perceived relationships. To Adams, one of these relation­
ships consisted of his profound understanding of Europe and its
118
connection with the New World. At the same time, it may be said
that this very intuitive facility was the result of profound
study, experience, and analysis, the product of assiduous
effort, so much so that the result would be an instant grasp of
the paradigmatic. Indeed, he provided himself with the richness
of ideas to make this possible at an early age because of his
varied and comprehensive education. Therefore, at each stage of
his analytical thinking, Adams conformed to Locke*s belief that
each part of a process of reasoning must be supported by intui- 
119
tive evidence.
This acquisition of knowledge as the state of being cer­
tain led him to a degree of belief in values which could almost 
be accounted religious dogma. A manifestation of these beliefs 
was his diplomatic correspondence, which was, like most of his 
writings, based upon profound knowledge and careful study. As a
34
case-in-point concerning the Monroe Doctrine, there is his 1823 
letter to Richard C. Anderson, American Minister to Spain, in 
which an intuitive grasp of the inevitability of human progress 
is combined with an intuitive belief in the efficacy of princi­
ple as the guiding force in international relations. A few pas­
sages are illustrative of Adams* thinking as he applies princi­
ple to an empirical situation: "The European alliance of emper­
ors and kings have assumed as the foundation of human society 
the doctrine of unalienable allegiance. Our doctrine is founded 
upon the principle of unalienable right." Or: "Civil, politi­
cal, commercial and religious liberty are but various modifica­
tions of one great principle founded in the unalienable rights 
of human nature, and before the universal application of which
the colonial domination of Europe over the American hemisphere
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has fallen, and is crumbling into dust." One can discern here 
the manner in which the activating idea of principle formed the 
unifying force of the ideas of Adams, lending them a paradigma­
tic mixed mode integration as knowledge. The process was dis­
tinctly redolent of Locke, and produced a distinct force of 
action. The Monroe Doctrine— largely the handiwork of Adams, 
especially the non-colonization paragraph--was enunciated by
121
President Monroe in a message to Congress on December 2, 1823* 
But there were other ideas of Locke which John Quincy 
Adams strove to apply. One of these was the question of order 
in relation to God's will. It was a question which the acquisi­
tion of Florida brought out for him, because he regarded the 
signing of the treaty with Spain which brought this about to be
35
the most important act of his lifet a working out of divine pro- 
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vidence. It represented for him the transfer of sovereignty from 
the chaotic will of a monarch to the ordered will of a govern­
ment which was a social compact governed by reasons an ordering 
of reality according to the will of Godf for the happiness of 
man. Concomitantly, it is not surprising that he believed that 
Europe was incorrigibly corrupt, and an adherent of outmoded
political practices, and that he was concerned for moral order
123
and the community of men. The bringing into being of this moral
order resided in treaties, the use of military forces, and other
means. The treaty with Spain was signed on February 22, 1819,
after long and acrimonious negotiations between Adams and Don
Luis de Onis. It not only ceded Florida to the United States, it
defined the national borders in an exceedingly advantageous way
124
by favorably rectifying the limits of the Ladsiana Purchase. It
also provided for the American government to assume all the
claims of its citizens against Spain up to $5 million, and to
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renounce all claims to Texas. With these measures, the social
compact would now hold sway over an unprecedentedly wider area—
an area in which reason and the will of God would prevail.
Instead of the imbalance of human forces manifested in greed and
malevolence, and institutionalized in monarchical rule, there
would be order based upon rational choices, and justice in
treatment and in the allocation of resources. There would be
governmental and behavioral stability, for, as Locke maintained,
126
justice and truth are the common ties of society.
In order to understand precisely why and how Adams
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acquired Florida for the United States, his actions must be 
explained in terms of these precepts. In 1818, because of the 
depredations of Indian raiders from Florida upon adjacent Amer­
ican territory and populations, General Andrew Jackson was dis­
patched with a military force to pursue them across the border. 
He occupied Pensacola, executed Arbuthnot and Armbrister, Brit­
ish subjects who had assisted the Indians, and performed other
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military acts to restore order. To Don Luis de Onis, Adams
defended Jackson's actions and urged Spain to honor the 1795
treaty with the United States in which Spain pledged to res-
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train the Indians in its colonies. At once, one can see that 
the question of order arises. There was concern on the part of 
Adams for both the restoration of the status quo ante, in which 
at least the simulacrum of order prevailed, though it may not 
have been inherent, and the sanctity of treaties as freely- 
contracted obligations. In the latter instance, if the condi­
tions under which the treaty was contracted had changed, the 
United States, as one of the freely-contracting parties, would
have had the right to renounce that treaty and to act to defend
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itself in the interest of self-preservation. Adams was quite
explicit about this. In an 1818 letter to George William Erving
he definitively condemned the Indians as savages, and declared
that it was the duty of the United States government to protect
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its people and their property. Here, in effect, he sought to 
utilize the power of the United States to bring about a condi­
tion of order in which men would not give way to their passions 
and act in a manner contrary to the law of nature. To Locke,
37
this law of nature was tantamount to the law of God, which is
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discerned by human reason* And, it is by reason that men deter-
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mine precisely what their own best interests are. This process 
of determination is a function of the creative manipulation and 
interchange of ideas within a social environment. With such an 
arrangement determining judgements of value, voluntary associa­
tion, and hence, an ordered psychological environment free of 
the negative emotional perturbations and inconsistencies of 
value characterizing non-social existence, must be implied. 
Therefore, to Locke, without the law of nature— and of God, and 
without the contractual consent of the members of that society, 
no social organization could be acceptable. Indeed, to Locke,
the idea of consent was central to the very constitution of 
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society. John Quincy Adams held similar views. He believed that
the first moral element of civil government was sympathy among
13^
the members who comprise it. There is thus brought about a 
state of order, both in terms of action and in terms of thought.
With such unshakable moral beliefs forming so important a 
part of his world-view, it is not surprising that Adams vigor­
ously defended Jackson*s actions, even in the face of the oppo­
sition of President Monroe, Treasury Secretary William Crawford,
War Secretary John C. Calhoun, and Attorney General William 
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Wirt. Andrew Jackson was, in effect, the moral agent who sought 
to impose--or reimpose— a state of interactive equilibrium 
among the members of the society delimited by the boundaries of 
Florida. In such an environment, again in a state of moral 
order, each person could pursue, by reason, his own means of
38
self-fulfillment. And, because of this, it may be said that
Jackson was the unknowing actor bringing about a condition that
Adams favored. This favor was backed by a powerful will marked
by the belief that by his interpretation of divine thought, he
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could covenent with God, and thereby regenerate mankind.
But Florida was merely the prelude to the far larger 
question of the acquisition of the Oregon Territory. This was a 
complicated affair which involved not only Spain, but also Bri­
tain and Russia, and formed the grand theater within which 
Adams' Lockean ideas concerning the state as an ordered moral 
covenant could be played out. His desire to acquire this terri­
tory lay deep in his belief that it was in the order of nature 
that the moral improvement of man should keep pace with the
multiplication of his physical capacities, comforts, and enjoy- 
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ments. Consequently, because of such a belief, it is not sur­
prising that Adams alone among American statesmen understood
138
the value of the Northwest. To his way of thinking, only the 
Americans possessed this capacity in the highest degree, and 
this multiplicative effort was intimately related to the capa­
city to improve the environment by the creation and acquisition
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of private property. To Locke, property amounted to an indivi­
dual's moral power over his own, as it was his labor which
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acquired and "encloses it from the common". Consequently, Adams 
may be said to have wished that as much of the North American 
continent as possible be placed under the improving hand of the 
American people so that the ordered, reasoned moral communitas 
would be as large as possible so that God's will cbuld be done
as grandly as possible.
To accomplish this, Adams, both personally and through sub­
ordinates, engaged in what turned out to be a complex series of 
negotiations, sometimes alone; al? other times in combination 
with other negotiations, such as those involving the Spanish 
cession, or the rectification of the American-Canadian border. 
Again, one may think of the intellectual processes of Adams as a 
free variation of ideas, or what Locke thought of as the putting
together of simple ideas in new ways in order to produce complex 
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ones. The complex idea of Adams was that of an integrated soci­
ety rescued from the separate corruptions of particular European 
societies. The power to bring forth this idea lay in the ability 
to place under consideration ideas which were out of sight, and 
to do this at one's own choice, and then to compare which of
them one considered fit. Thought would be followed by action in
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order to bring the idea into effect. Adams was therefore a per­
son whose individuality was integrated by that complex idea 
"America as a social compact", so much so that he could stand up 
to any adversity. In his own words from the Lectures on Rhetoric 
and Oratory: "The most strenuous energies of the human mind . .
are always employed, where they are instigated by the stimulus
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of the highest rewards." Again, there was the free will under 
stimulus of incentive— the moral and the pragmatic combined. It 
is well that he thought this way because it would not be for 
many years yet before the United States would acquire the Oregon 
Territory.
As an illustration of Adams' determination to bring about
b o
this synthesis of ideas in reality, one may again cite the 1818
letter to George William Ervings
Your authority and instructions are amply sufficient for 
the conclusion of a treaty and no alteration of them is 
deemed necessary. It is, however, to be remarked that 
the impression upon the public opinion of this country, 
of our unquestionable right to the Rio Bravo as the wes­
tern boundary, is from day to day becoming stronger, and 
you will give it very distinctly to be understood, that 
in offering now to agree by treaty to the substitute of 
the Colorado, the United States will not hold themselves 
bound to abide by the same offer at any future period.lbb
From what has been previously stated about Adams, it is evident 
that this statement was expressed out of a profound conviction 
of moral superiority. In terms of Locke, this action, and the 
complex of other actions determining his pursuit of this pol­
icy, sprang from an ’’uneasiness" which was a function of the 
perceived moral necessity to bring about the intended result—  
a United States which embraced both the Atlantic and Pacific 
coasts. Locke summed up this perception by maintaining that the
greatest positive good determines uneasiness, and that uneasi-
1 b5
ness determines the will.
Compelled by a moral imperative of such scale and inten­
sity, Adams was equally determined the following year. In a 
letter to Onis he stated". . . the proposal to draw the western 
boundary line between the United States and the Spanish terri­
tories on this continent from the source of the Missouri to the 
Columbia River cannot be admitted. I have to add . . . this 
government repeats the proposal contained in my letter to you 
of 31st October last; . . • But if your powers are incompetent
to accept either of these offers, the President thinks it use-
lb6
less to pursue the discussion any further." His intransigence
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bore fruit. The treaty was signed in 1819*
Within this same complex of actions adumbrated by the 
moral imperative of American territorial expansion, John Quincy 
Adams also dealt with Russia concerning trade and the Pacific 
coastal boundaries. As early as 17^3 he had had a negative
147
opinion of that country, and in particular, its despotic rule.
However, his views subsequently moderated, particularly when he
was American Minister in St. Petersburg. Indeed, he grew to
praise Tsar Alexander I for his restrained European policies in
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regard to the Holy Alliance. Nevertheless, a mildly positive 
view of Russia was not allowed to bring about an acquiescence 
in Russian attempts to claim the northwestern Pacific coast of 
North America. Again, Adams' concept of the expansion of the 
American moral covenant could not be denied. In an 1822 letter 
to the Russian Foreign Minister, Pierre de Politica, he firmly 
rejected the Russian claim that its sovereignty extended all 
the way to the fifty-first degree of north latitude and to 
within one hundred Italian miles of the coast, citing as rea­
sons the right to navigate those waters as an inherent right of
national independence, and the right of American citizens to
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trade with the Indians in the area. Here, Adams obviously 
wished to establish a future American right of property. The 
people of the United States should be free to extract from the 
environment (in this case, by trade) what was necessary for 
their sustenance, and to produce property from it. The tangible 
realization of this right was provided by the American vessels 
which hunted the sea otter, and which, by their presence,
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afforded the United States maritime supremacy on the Pacific 
150 
coast.
With this, it remains only to discuss some of John Quincy 
Adams' preliminary sparring with the British over the Oregon 
Territory and other matters. Again, his adamant position would 
eventually have an effect— the complete transfer of that terri­
tory to the United States. However, this would only occur many 
years later as an event witnessed by John Quincy Adams, Con­
gressman.
In the negotiations over Oregon his Anglophobia once
again manifested itself. It was evident both because he.was
against monarchies in general, stating quite categorically, "In
151
the theories of the Crown and the Mitre man had no rights", and 
because he believed that Britain had sought to retard the full 
development of the potential of the American political realm as 
a social compact by first holding on to its American colonies 
as long as possible, and then by continuing to adopt an arro­
gant attitude in its relationship with a now independent United 
States. For example, in an I8l6 letter to his father, he stated
that "Wherever British influence extends, it is busy to blacken
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us in every possible manner."
As an illustration of this British abuse, one can study
the matter of trade. Trade was quite important to Locke, as he
maintained that it was very important in promoting the wealth
153
and power of a nation. Adams was in perfect accord with this. 
This favorable attitude towards trade was bound up with the 
recurring concept of property. The more goods, the more wealth
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acquired by trade, the more a nation has to utilize in regard 
to manufacturing and acquiring property, or that which insures 
the survivability of that society. The British frustration of 
American trade designs may be looked upon as yet smother method 
used by the British to frustrate the full development of the 
American society as a social compact. In a letter to Albert 
Gallatin and Benjamin Rush, American negotiators of an Anglo- 
American trade agreement in 1818, dealing in part with the Bri­
tish denial of American commerce with its West Indies colonies, 
Adams stated: "When the British ministry say against all this 
(trade with the West Indies), our ancestors established a sys­
tem and therefore we must maintain it, we may reply, if your 
ancestors establish a system in defiance of the laws of nature, 
it is your interest and your duty to abolish it. But who can 
overlook or be blind to the changes of circumstances of the
establishment and growth of the United States as an independent 
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power . . . "  The obvious implication here is that the United 
States was in conformance with the law of nature, and that 
Great Britain was not.
According to Adams, an even more blatant example of this 
transgressive behavior was British intransigence in the complex 
and protracted dispute over the final ownership of the Oregon 
Territory. In that same letter to Gallatin and Rush, he stated 
that "the new pretension (after the disputateous negotiations 
at Ghent) however, of disputing our title to the settlement at 
the mouth of Columbia River, either indicates a design on their 
part to encroach by new establishments of their own upon the
Zj4
forty-ninth parallel of latitude, south of which they can have 
no valid claim upon this continent, or it manifests a jealousy 
of the United States, a desire to check the progress of our 
settlement, of which it might have been supposed that experi-
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ence would before this day have relieved them." He could well
believe in the ultimate futility of the British attempts to
frustrate American settlement in Oregon, as he believed in the
Biblical command to "be fruitful and multiply" in its sanction
of the supposed superior right of the American people to the
area as compared with that of the British agent, the Hudson's 
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Bay Company. He was thus prepared to prolong the diplomatic 
stalemate. He could picture Oregon ever more completely occu­
pied by ever larger numbers of Americans. Every visualization 
of quantum increase; every visualization of new national prero­
gatives springing forth as a function of the increasing num­
bers; every visualization of the concomitant decline of British 
power in the area--they all represented expressions of self, 
and Adams' projection of himself into the future. This was, as
Locke would put it, the continuation of individual existence
157
commensurate with the succession of ideas in the mind.
THE LOCKEAN BASIS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
There will now be an examination of the foreign policy of
John Quincy Adams in terms of Lockean content, essentially as
sl extension of his work as Secretary of State, and as a
reflection of a Lockean concept of the Chief Executive. That
is, Locke treated foreign policy as the "Federative Power",
which is normally exercised by the head of state without subor- 
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dination. Likewise, Adams believed that the President was the 
supreme power in foreign affairs. For example, when he was Pre­
sident, he resented a Senate request for papers that required 
him to designate which of them were relevant to current negoti­
ations and should therefore remain secret, maintaining that
159
this was a violation of the rules on executive business.
As President then, Adams had to deal with many of the 
same problems he had dealt with as Secretary of State. They 
involved the stability and independence of the new Latin Ameri­
can republics; relations with France; and relations with Great 
Britain concerning the Oregon Territory, trade, and boundary 
rectifications. In addition, there were the problems of Greece, 
and of Cuba, a Latin American dependency which had remained in 
Spanish hands after other Spanish colonies in the New World had 
revolted. Throughout, analysis of each of these problems will 
again be in terms of such Lockean concepts as: (1) The state as 
a condition of moral order; (2) The self as defined by con-
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sciousness; (3) The self as thought and action; and (4) Know­
ledge as the product of mind. These and subsidiary concepts pro­
vided a conceptual framework for a program of foreign relations 
that was at onpe both morally and pragmatically in the national
interest. The result of such an ethic was a spirit of inventive-
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ness and political compromise. However, interaction among men 
within a Lockean framework would also produce moral restraint, 
and because of Adams' profound moral sense, his pragmatism was 
modified. As a result, his policies were characterized by an 
essential honesty— as President, as well as, indeed, as Secre­
tary of State— for which he was widely respected by the diploma-
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tic community both in Washington and in Europe. In terms of 
Locke, his concept of a foreign policy of equanimity was a mixed 
mode synthesis of ideas which produced a conceptual structure 
that was independent of the exigencies of empirical reality.
This combination of morality and pragmatism was also dem­
onstrated in Adams' Secretary of State, Henry Clay. Like the 
President, he believed in balance and harmony in foreign
affairs. But, whereas Adams relied upon conscience to impose
162
order, Clay relied more upon creative calculation. In effect, 
their working relationship involved a dyadic Lockean synthesis.
At this point it would be relevant to discuss the ques­
tion of the so-called "corrupt bargain" wherein Adams was sup­
posedly electorally supported by Clay in the House of Represen­
tatives, where the 1824 Presidential election had been thrown 
when none of the candidates had received a majority of elec­
toral votes, in exchange for being named Secretary of State.
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Actually, it would appear that there was a conceptual interact­
ion between the two men which presaged their subsequent rela­
tionship. For example, their thinking in foreign affairs had 
expanded well beyond the merely regional outlooks characteris­
tic of the other candidates, Crawford and Jackson. Its basis
was the exploitation of the initiatives of the Monroe Doctrine
163
in order to lend a positive effect to the course of change. In
effect, such a policy represented a Lockean emphasis upon
164
action as the best evidence of principle.
In order to determine precisely how much congruence there
indeed was between the thinking of the two men, Adams did
arrange a meeting, however. He described it in his diarys
Mr. Clay . . . spent the evening with me in a long con­
versation explanatory of the past and prospective of the 
future . . .  He wished me, as far as I might think pro­
per, to satisfy him with regard to some principles of 
great public importance, but without any personal consi­
derations for himself. In the question to come before 
the House between General Jackson, Mr. Crawford, and 
myself, he had no hesitation in saying that his prefer­
ence would be for me. 165
The decision appears to have rested upon issue and belief, 
rather than corrupt patronage. What is more, the writer of a 
then anonymous letter accusing Adams and Clay of such corrup­
tion, Representative George Kremer of Pennsylvania, later could
not, or would not, substantiate the charge before the House
166
investigatory committee which Clay had requested. Consequently, 
one may at least surmise that belief and conscience were far 
more evident here than sheer raw pragmatism.
A clue to the characteristics of Adams' conscience can be 
found in his attitude towards obtaining that very Presidency
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itself. In order for there to be an absence of evil consequen­
ces accruing from his actions, there had to be equanimity of 
effort. Therefore, if he were to be elected President, it would 
have to be as the result of actions which did not cause strife 
and animosity. An 1818 passage from his diary is illustrative!
He (Everett) also asked me if I was determined to do 
nothing with a view to promote my future election to 
the Presidency as the successor of Mr. Monroe. I told 
him I should do absolutely nothing. He said that as 
others would not be so scrupulous, I should not stand 
upon equal footing with them. I told him that was not
my fault my business was to serve the public to the
best of my abilities in the station assigned to me, 
and not to intrigue for further advancement . . . 167
Within a Lockean framework, his universe of moral beliefs, in 
interaction with his analytical mind, produced an integrated 
paradigmatic envisioned structure of actions by the buildup of 
simple ideas, existing passively in his mind, into complex 
ideas. The dynamic of their combining and recombining pro­
duced an outline of action, which could be powerfully put into 
168 
effect.
This contained power of the mind was intimately related 
to intellectual and moral autonomy, which Adams possessed in 
abundance. In this instance, it focused upon an unwillingness to 
make political deals, as he stated: "If that office (the Presi­
dency) was to be the price of cabal and intrigue, of purchasing
newspapers, bribing by appointments, or bargaining for foreign
169
missions, I had no ticket in that lottery . . ." A rigid moral 
belief here may be said to have caused Adams to produce, by a 
combination and recombination of ideas concerning the degrading 
consequences of alternative patterns of actions, a will to
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resolve the uneasiness attendant to the temptations involved in 
wishing to he the President of the United States. From that 
resolution of uneasiness it would simply he one more logical 
step to project that effort to resolve contending forces into 
the social reality as a whole. An abstract balancing of social 
forces would he the justification for his effort as President, 
which would, in turn, regulate his desires, or personal ambi­
tions. Rationality would he used to regulate all activities, 
both public and private, in a grand moral state. And, with 
this, there would also be a further strong abstract reason why 
he could never have entered into the "corrupt bargain".
In an individual sense, moral certainty was produced. For 
Adams, this could only have been the equivalent of knowledge.
In a Lockean sense, moral knowledge, since it comes from God, 
is capable of real certainty, which is the perception of the 
agreement or disagreement of ideas. Moral ideas are complete, 
and hence, the perception of the agreement or disagreement
170
among them produces real knowledge, unalloyed by misperception.
This certainty, in Adams' case, took on a Puritan cast, and
guided his actions. Indeed, in 1826, he engaged in a public
profession of faith, a tradition which had originated with the 
171
Puritans. By actively seeking the Presidential nomination, he 
would be lending credibility to faction, or political party, 
thereby lending legitimacy to conditions marking a departure 
from the homogeneously moral. The synthesis of true knowledge, 
and its resultant actions, would not occur.
In a more wide-ranging sense, a moralistic synthesis of
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balance was characteristic of his "American System" in both
172
foreign and domestic affairs. In the former, a good example of 
this would be the Monroe Doctrine. This document transformed 
the Lockean principles of self-determination, self-identifica­
tion, and self-protection into the three ideological norms of
173
American foreign policy. It meant that a Lockean atmosphere of
moral order in which reason prevailed would apply to the entire
Western hemisphere, free of European interference. .The United
States would be hegemonous as the proclaimer to mankind of the
inextinguishable rights of human nature, and the only lawful
174
foundations of government. Indeed, American diplomats in Latin
America, under Adams' administration, operated within this con- 
175 
ception.
At the same time, in a pragmatic synthesis characteristic
of Locke, Adams believed in a balance of power among nations,
an interactive state controlled by the reasonable perceptions
and actions of reasonable men. It would be a projection of the
moral person into the international sphere. Morality implys
reciprocity, for only in this can respect for rights such as
individuality and property be maintained, while at the same
time preserving an atmosphere of freedom in which one can
accomplish one's aims. With such a firm moral basis, Adams
could have no doubt about the pragmatic aims with which such a
morality was alloyed. At the same time, the adherence to such a
synthesis meant that he could be an expansionist and an imperi-
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alist, but in the name of an idealism of anti-imperialsim. This 
ability to combine contradictions of thought and action into a
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mixed mode synthesis was a measure of the power and flexibility 
of his mind.
Trade was a policy which manifested this. For Adams, its
basic tenets were reciprocal equality of access to the world's
markets in time of peace, and a preservation of neutral rights
177
to that freedom of trade in times of war. Trade would be based
upon complex and involved ideas resulting from the gathering of
data from trade, simple ideas, and the powerful combining of
the empirical and the imaginative into concepts which were both
abstract and applicable. Indeed, according to Locke, general
and certain truths could only be founded upon the dispositions
178
and relations of abstract ideas. The true conception here would 
be a workable paradigm which would accomodate many contingen­
cies of reality in order to bring about not only a conceptual 
enrichment for those immediately involved by opening up new 
opportunities for the reception of ideas and perceptions, but 
also a national enrichment. This controlling paradigm would 
exist as a sense of moral imperative which would project beyond 
experience into an integral view of the world. This view would
grow out of the non-relativism of moral concepts, which exist
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as immutably as the axioms of geometry, and which are therefore
balanced and non-deformable in their application. This was
reflected in the thinking of John Quincy Adams, as he regarded
every public measure subjected to his consideration as essenti-
180
ally a Euclidean proposition. Such balanced thinking extended 
into the reality of nations meant that all of them were equal 
in regard to their external relations.
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However, this type of thinking was put to a severe test
when he dealt with the issue of trade with the British West
Indies colonies. Adams regarded this problem, and the right to
colonial trade in general, to be, next to impressment, the most
important problem between Great Britain and the United States
181
since American independence had been won. In this instance, he 
was obliged to deal with statesmen who had perhaps not yet 
reconciled themselves to American independence, and who were, 
as a result, not yet ready to concede that the two countries 
were equals. The British statesmen, in effect, refused to con­
ceive of the United States as a moral person, an entity posses­
sing ethical legitimacy. According to Locke, ethical concepts 
182
are mixed modes. In this usage, they are scattered and indepen­
dent ideas which are put together by the mind. They have no
183
relationship to real beings. They are universals, applicable in
a protean manner. Thus, Locke believed that universals are made
only when the mind abstracts, and abstraction is a mental oper-
18**
ation which is distinct from sensation. Nevertheless, before 
the ethical concept of the moral person could be synthesized, a 
balanced series of conceptualizations, unalloyed by prejudices, 
would have to occur, because the cognate ideas would be derived 
from empirical models. These empirical models were obviously 
negatively one-sided, involving memories of defeat in war, the 
betrayal of British institutions by a people who once called 
themselves Englishmen, and so forth. These empirically-derived 
ideas obviously could not be made to form the mixed mode of 
which the ethical concept consisted. An unbalanced synthesis
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was the result; a syncretic concept involving a portrait of the 
United States as evil— despite the non-empirical potential of 
the mixed mode--rather than as an inherent constituent of a 
world moral order. And, since actions would put into effect 
such ideas, reciprocity of trade could not be accepted by the 
British as a policy with their one-time colony.
These ideas in mind, the British began to deal with the 
Americans over the issue of trade with their West Indies colo­
nies. In this, they effected a supercilious assumption of supe-
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riority. It was emotional, perhaps with a degree of revenge in 
mind. On the other hand, John Quincy Adams dedicated himself to 
a painstaking regulation of his activities in this sphere, as 
in all others, by conscience and a goal-oriented rationality.
The goal in this case was trade expansion, which he and his
186
Secretary of State, Henry Clay, would work towards.
Adams' dealings with the British had reached back through 
his tenure as Secretary of State to his efforts as chief Ameri­
can negotiator at Ghent in I8l4. That has already been touched 
upon. And, they had always proved refractory. Nevertheless, the 
two countries had carried on a flourishing trade for years. 
After Ghent, he had signed a commercial convention of trade 
reciprocity in London which reflected this, and remained the
legal basis for commercial relations between the two countries
187
throughout this period. What is more, on June Zb% 1821, Parlia­
ment had passed an act which had opened certain British North 
American ports to commercial American vessels. In return, Pres­
ident Monroe had proclaimed American ports open to British ves-
5**
sels employed in trade between the United States and the West 
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Indies. Here, because of the mutual perception of similar ideas, 
in regard to trade and other matters, there was at least the 
possibility of effecting a synthesis of a mixed mode of moral 
perception, which would have, in time, perhaps led to a belief 
in reciprocity arising in other areas. The possibility of a 
significant easing of tensions between the two nations presented 
itself.
However, such an occurrence was not to be, at least during 
the 1817 to 1829 period, when John Quincy Adams controlled Amer­
ican foreign policy. For example, according to the 1821 Act, 
Britain retained certain protective duties which gave advantages
to the commerce of her North American colonies in the West 
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Indies. What is more, Britain ignored the fact that the trade 
was strictly limited to certain enumerated colonial ports for 
American vessels and to certain enumerated articles, which 
excluded New England products such as fish and salted provi­
sions, and that the United States did not gain access to the
190
indirect traffic through the West Indies.
One result of this egregious situation was the fact that 
tensions were heightened between New England, which relied heav­
ily on fisheries, and the rest of the country, which was agri- 
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cultural. Centrifugal forces were at work, militating against
the concept of the moral state. The fixed integrity of that
moral' concept had to be maintained for the mixed mode of moral
perception to exist. According to Locke, power and action form
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the greatest part of the mixed modes, and have the greatest
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effect upon the mind. The actors in this instance would he New 
Englanders. The balanced, integral rationality of the moral 
perception would be, with this, the victim of empirical exi­
gency existing independently of its empirical complement, i.e., 
the other areas of the country. Action had to be faced with 
counteraction. The synthesis of the moral state had to be 
allowed to proceed, certainly before its values could be inte­
grated enough to be projected over the radius of the entire 
hemisphere. Adams acted.
In 1823 Congress, under his direction, opened American 
ports to British ships coming from colonial ports, but only
from precisely those ports to which American ships were admit- 
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ted. Supposedly, the British would be forced by this to pragma­
tically act in order to produce an actual equilibrium of trade. 
There would be a comparison of ideas, this time embodied in 
causes and effects, in order to produce models of consequences.
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This model would be a mode, called by Locke a relation, which 
would eventually evolve by a process of comparison into a mode 
more nearly resembling that of the moral equilibrium which 
Adams envisioned.
However, the situation did not resolve itself in that 
direction. Congress had also authorized the President to impose 
a ten percent discriminatory tariff on colonial goods transpor­
ted in British vessels until Britain eliminated all colonial 
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preferences. Accordingly, on May 12, 1826, Huskisson, President 
of the British Board of Trade, gave a speech before the House 
of Commons, in which he stated that his country had been forced
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into a situation of trade reciprocity in the fi^st place
because of the compulsion of the retaliatory duties enacted by
196
the United States. Britain then again barred American trade
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with its West Indies possessions. British prejudices against 
Americans had produced an uneasiness in the combining of ideas, 
which militated against their resolution in terms of a moral 
equilibrium. Essentially, that was what Adams had feared. In 
1823 he had informed Richard Rush that he doubted that counter­
vailing American restrictions would enable American vessels to
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trade in equal competition with the British. The British were
simply not willing to formulate the moral paradigm, or mixed
mode, of reciprocity of trade.
A somewhat similar situation prevailed with France, which
evinced the same type of refractory behavior. But, at the same
time, Adams could view that nation in a more considered light.
For one thing, he saw that while France was cloaking its
actions by rhetoric proclaiming the rights of man, it was actu-
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ally engaging in plunder and conquest. He also considered that,
because of this, French ideology was a radical threat to the
security of the United States, and that France itself was part
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of the overal problem of the instability of Europe. Now, insta­
bility implies irrationality, the greatest enemy of the moral 
universe that Adams wished to synthesize. The ideals of revolu­
tionary France may be thought of as a concatenation of simple 
impressions and other types of information which were caused to 
combine in the mind in ways which did not serve moral ends.
They would not be integrated into an autonomous concept, and
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would lack the balance bf moral order. One had only to look to 
the example of the Reign of Terror. To Adams, the theories 
growing out of the French Revolution were further from true
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democracy than the practices of the British House of Commons.
If those theories were a mixed mocLe of a complex form conceptu­
ally inimical to American interests, it had to be because the 
simple ideas of which it consisted were themselves inimical to 
American interests, since, although the ideas were subjected to
free variation in the mind, that same mind varied collections 
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of ideas only, and not the original characteristics of the
ideas themselves. There were limits to the mind's level of
paradigmatic manipulation.
Adams sought a way out of the quandary of having the two
most powerful European nations hostile to the United States.
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The solution was to use France as a counterweight to Britain.
This idea would represent a congruence of Lockean political and
philosophical ideas. Politically, since the relationships
between nations are not naturally peaceful, like the state of
nature between persons, a balance of power is the only rational 
20^
solution. This condition of balance may be thought of as a
mixed mode conceptualization in which the ideas "Britain" and
"France", with all their attendant characteristics in regard to
the United States, were first combined under the subsumption
"Britain and France" in order to form relations of ideas.
According to Locke, these relations consist of the considera-
2°5
tion and comparison of ideas. They are then combined into ideas 
which are given the moral sanction of balance.
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However, on a more mundane level, because of French hos­
tility, there were trade difficulties. In 1822 France, which 
had signed a temporary agreement to reciprocally abandon dis­
criminating duties over the next four years, repeatedly 
expressed its dissatisfaction with American tariffs on spirits 
and silk, and threatened to abrogate the agreement. In 1826 and 
1827» after Adams had become President, the French began to 
rigidly enforce regulations which levied high tariffs on indi­
rect American traffic. The United States eventually yielded to 
such pressure, reducing levies on French imports, such as wine, 
and, in effect, creating a barter arrangement, because the 
resulting increase in American sales of French products pre­
cisely offset the costs of American products, such as cotton,
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tobacco, and potash, to France. It was a forced, and not a nat­
ural reciprocity, and had been purged of any potential for a 
moral dimension. Since the basic ideas comprising the two mixed 
mode concepts of trade reciprocity were incompatible, and since 
mixed modes are abstract and complex concepts, their conceptual 
outlines could never be reconciled by empirically-derived 
ideas. Either trade was reciprocal, with its moral sanction, or 
it was not. The situation was disillusioning, and, in Adams, 
such a process produced stubbornness. An entry from his diary 
is illustrative:
Mr. Clay brought a written note from the French Minis­
ter, the Baron de Mareuil, requesting that I would 
appoint a time when he would come and offer me his con­
gratulations on the New Year and present to me all the 
members of his Legation; which I declined • . . Mr.
Clay had prepared an answer, expressing much acknow­
ledgment for the kindness of the Baron, but that no
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usage, having warranted such a formality, I did not feel 
justified to introduce it. 207
Adams would brook no interference with his concept of moral
order.
With Latin America also, there was an attempt at a genu­
ine reciprocity of trade. Here, again, he called for treatment 
on a footing of most-favored, most friendly nation, and empha­
sized that American disagreements with the Latin American
states arose from commercial discriminations which favored
208
other nations, and privateers and paper blockades. He pointed
to the commercial treaties which the United States had with
Colombia and Central America as successful efforts to eliminate
such practices and to establish reciprocity. It is important to
note that Adams did not wish for European nations— especially
Great Britain— to establish colonies in Latin America, with
their closed systems of trade, because such a development would
209
interfere with the existing rights of the United States. Hence, 
trade considerations may be understood as a factor in the Amer­
ican ability to integrate the Latin American republics into a 
moral universe under its leadership. This consideration was
uppermost in the mind of John Quincy Adams. He was little
210
influenced by the business community.
Balance and equanimity also characterized the efforts of
Adams (and Clay) as they sought to resolve the problem of the
northern boundary of the United States. This was very important
to Adams, as he felt that the selfish and intriguing policies
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of Europe were a disturbing influence on American life. The 
boundaries of the moral state had to be precisely delimited in
60
order to reflect the definitive relinquishment of sovereignty
by the chaotic and immoral monarch to that moral state in which
God's will could be done. What is more, the constant invasion
of foreign (British, Spanish, or Russian) elements across an
inexact border would cause the untoward infusion of inimical
concrete ideas into the thinking of the inhabitants of that
state, thereby delaying the synthesis of the mixed mode
abstract.intellectual entity which comprised the idea of the
moral state, or the state as a moral person. This was an old
problem Adams had faced.
He endeavored to negate this process, especially in view
of the fact that he believed that Great Britain was looking for
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territory everywhere, and because much of his effort was a con­
tinuation of policies he had pursued as Secretary of State. 
Therefore, both he and his Secretary of State, Henry Clay, 
attempted to bring about a settlement of the Canadian border, 
and to define the bounds of American sovereignty over the Ore­
gon Territory. Thus, to Adams, the idea of the moral, rational 
state developing and gaining strength, unalloyed by foreign 
ideologies, had an air of inevitability. Because of this, he
believed that all North America must, in time, fall into Ameri- 
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can hands. This conviction was, again, an instance of his trust 
in the efficacy of reason, as he had confidence in the achieve­
ment of virtue under the pressure of conscience and inborn 
21**
will. In Lockean terms, the attainment of this state (of the 
realization of national destiny) would be the resolution of 
some uneasiness, resolving itself into a corporate moral person
61
characterized by the sum of the rights of all its members. In
effect, there would be a stable institutionalization of the
Lockean principles of self-determination (the self as thought
and action), self-identification (the self defined by con-
sciuosness), and self-protection (the production of property as
215
the definer of self). As a corollary of this, since, according
to Locke, if all men have rights, then boundaries are neces- 
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sary, the complete distinguishing of America, the moral person,
from a world still largely controlled by chaotic and corrupt
monarchies would inhere in the generalized corporate definition
of those boundaries. What is more, to Adams, this moral person
could then perpetuate itself, for to him, common sympathies
belonged and were indispensable to the relations that were
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ordained by nature between the individual and his country.
One area of boundary instability was the northeastern 
corner of the United States. Here, Maine and Massachusetts 
asserted claims along the St. John River, so much so that an 
American settler, John Baker, was arrested by New Brunswick 
authorities for holding title to what they considered to be 
Canadian territory. Albert Gallatin, American Minister to Bri­
tain, was instructed to submit the dispute to arbitration, an
218
arrangement completed in September, 1827*
Again, there was the idea of rational balance. In this 
instance, the purpose of the conceptual balance was the obvia­
tion of British hostility by reason, and the delimitation of 
the area over which Americans could exercise their will and 
their choice in synthesizing those elements from the environ­
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ment necessary for the creation of the moral state. Again, in 
producing such a mixed mode, one had to be careful that ideas 
derived from a troubled reality— a reality disturbed by the 
untoward perception of British power--were not limited in num­
ber and range by such a consideration. Being so limited by a 
comparison of British actions with moral rules, for example, 
the free variation of ideas needed to produce a mixed mode syn­
thesis could not take place. Such a situation would have been 
of particular importance to Locke, as he had human actions,
particularly of moral significance, in mind when he discussed 
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mixed modes. The effects of arbitration offered a greater pos­
sibility for the free variation of ideas than if all American 
ideas were simply concepts of British hostility.
The effects of such inimical thinking were obvious. For
example, Adams put this entry in his diary for 1827*
He (Levi Lincoln) spoke of the late correspondence 
between his brother Enoch Lincoln, the Governor of 
Maine, and the Secretary of State, relating to our con­
troversy with Great Britain concerning the Northeastern 
boundary, and expressed much regret at the temper which 
the Governor of Maine had exhibited in it . . .As to 
this Northeastern boundary, there was an express 
engagement which bound the partner to refer the ques­
tion to the decision of a friendly sovereign, but the 
Commissioners had disagreed upon the facts, as upon 
everything else, and there was, and could be, no issue 
made up until a statement of facts could be agreed 
upon between the two Governments, to be submitted to 
the arbitrator. 220
In a Lockean sense, these negative feelings were the result of
a comparison of action with rule, in a relation, which is
221
another interaction of ideas, which is active, in comparison 
to the mixed mode endpoint of the process. The emotional situa­
tion was obviously unstable, so much so that the controversy
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remained open for many years. This was primarily because the
British wished to construct a military road across the disputed
222
territory to the ice-free port of St. John, Nova Scotia. It 
would appear that irreconciliably different ideas of actions, 
and hence, mixed modes, were involved, and since mixed modes 
are abstract, once formed, they would be peculiarly impervious 
to non-paradigmatic empirically-derived models of action.
The same irreconciliability involved the attitudes 
towards the other borders with British North American posses­
sions. The negotiations for the settlement of the Great Lakes 
boundary collapsed in 1827» when Britain demanded access to the 
channel which was to the south, rather than to the north, of
St. George’s Island, in the Neebish Straits of St. Mary's 
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River. This revealed, again, a very aggressive British atti­
tude. To that, Adams could only counterpoise reason. However, 
it was a temporally effecting reason whose inevitability he 
believed the British would, in time, concede. Just as he 
believed that the British position in Oregon was hopeless 
because of the superior American population and material 
resources in the area, he believed that a rational considera­
tion of the situation from their point of view would lead to a 
reciprocal state of affairs. The following illustrative passage 
was penned when Adams was Secretary of State, but the policies 
he subsequently followed as President were consistent with this 
way of thinking:
If the United States leave her (Great Britain) in undis­
turbed enjoyment of all her holds upon Europe, Asia, and 
Africa, with all her actual possessions in this hemi­
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sphere, we may very fairly expect that she will not 
think it consistent either with a wise or a friendly 
policy, to watch with eyes of jealousy and alarm, every 
possibility of extension to our natural dominion in 
North America, which she can have no solid interest to 
prevent, until all possibility of her preventing it 
shall have vanished. 224
This was a reasoned, rationalist view of historical process, a
natural and impersonal process of human forces, actions, and
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instincts, according to time and place. Through this unfolding
process, the "moral person" of the United States would most
fully realize its individuality by being free to utilize the
environment, without interference, for rational purposes of
moral development and survival. Hostile forces embodied in
ideas, being without a rational basis, i.e., one based upon the
freedom and dignity of the individual, and thereby congruent
with God's will, would inevitably be swept aside. This would
occur because the freedom to labor to improve the environment
by producing one's own property is an inherent right protected
226
by a just government. One would have far greater confidence
that such property would be protected, and not confiscated, by
a democratic, i.e., American, government, than by an arbitrary
monarchical, i.e., British, government. Adams' distrust of
such governments was uttered on numerous occasions. For
instance, in his address of July 4, 1821 he declared: "In the
227
theories of the Grown and the Mitre man had no rights."
This same distrust, of course, was evident in other bor­
der disputes. The American envoy to Britain, Albert Gallatin, 
could not obtain American access to the navigation of the St. 
Lawrence River in 1826. What is more, faced with British
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intransigence over the question of the Oregon Territory, he was
willing to push the forty-nine degree line far to the south
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after having crossed the line of the Columbia River. However,
Adams and Clay, alarmed by Gallatin's propensity to give up so
much, sharply limited his authority. A communication from Adams
to Clay is quite explicits
I propose to you to write him (Gallatin) a short letter 
immediately, stating that excepting any stipulation, 
involving a cession of territory, belonging to any 
state in the Union, or the abandonment express or 
implied, of the right to navigate the St. Lawrence, or 
the surrender of any territory South of Lat. on the
North-West-Coast, he will in all cases consider his 
Instructions as expressing our present views, and not 
as limiting his Powers. 229
A will was at work here, determined to see the United States
expand across the North American continent. This message was
simply another expression of Adams' belief that providence had
created the United States for the purpose of civilizing North
America, and through that example, to eliminate from the face
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of the earth all forms of European colonialism. This grand 
belief that he held as President, however, produced its own 
internally-generated moral sanction which led to a rational, 
displaced equilibrium. The implication of this sanction was 
reciprocity, that is, mutual non-interference. Hence, his 
declaration that the United States would not interfere with 
British sovereignty elsewhere in the world.
This matter of displaced equilibrium, in the sense that 
natural state boundaries should be allowed to evolve, free from 
colonializing interference, also arose in the matter of Greece. 
At first glance, it would appear that President Adams, in
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adhering to Lockean principles, would commit the resources of
the United States to assisting the Greeks in their attempt to
rid themselves of oppressive Ottoman rule. However, since such
precepts would emphasize the exercise of free and rational will
in order to formulate policies in the national interest as
231
maneuverings within a state of nature, he would not allow moral
considerations to become predominant in formulating policies
towards Greece.
The problem began when Adams was Secretary of State. When
the Greek revolt began in 1821, American public opinion was in
favor of aid to the insurgents because they were considered to
be the descendents of the Greek forefathers who had revealed
their greatness in the arts, philosophy, literature, and gov- 
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ernment, and because Turkish oppression was so brutal. However, 
by 1823s popular interest in their cause had waned, and Adams, 
as Secretary of State, strongly argued against American inter­
vention because, among other considerations, he did not wish
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to needlessly antagonize the Holy Alliance. It might also be 
surmised that he opposed American aid to Greece because he was 
so guided by rationalism, in general. The Philhellinism which 
had so fascinated the American people was an emotional parox­
ysm, rather than a reasoned conviction. In Lockean terms, it
23^
was error caused by a lack of proofs. Since, to Locke, ideas
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are propositions dealing with logic and morality, and since 
knowledge is the result of a meticulous comparison of empirical 
ideas in order to discern their agreement or disagreement, a 
lack of ideas derived from the empirical environment was what
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characterized such emotional feelings. Reason had not been 
brought to bear upon the problem, and it was reason which 
guided Adams.
The Greek problem reappeared after Adams had become Pres­
ident. In September, 1825 he sent William C. Somerville on a 
secret mission to Greece in order to investigate the progress 
of the revolt. He was to assure the Greek authorities that the 
American people wished that liberty and independence were 
re-established there. But, Somerville died en route, and three 
months later, in April, 1826, the Greek revolt was ruthlessly 
put down at Missolonghi. Nevertheless, Adams continued to
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encourage the Greek desire for independence, perhaps because of 
the emotional and timeless quality of the mixed mode concept 
"Greek self-government". In such a situation it could be said 
that Greece bore somewhat the same relationship to the Ottoman 
Empire that the United States bore to Great Britain, but with­
out the obviating factor of a similarity of institutions, and 
hence the abstract transmutation of their conceptual character­
istics into a mixed mode concept of morality, or some other 
conceptual generality. Ottoman repression had forced the Greeks 
to preclude certain courses of action which would have made 
them amenable to the kinds of perceptions necessary for the 
synthesis of a fully-developed knowledge leading to a sense of 
national identity. This sense of national identity would exist
as the certainty of moral knowledge arrived at, as always, by
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examining the agreement or the disagreement of ideas. Actions 
would be judged by their denial or affirmation of that idea.
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Since moral imperatives were involved here, Adams could not sim­
ply abandon interest in the Greek cause. However, within a Lock­
ean framework emphasizing the rational working out of solutions 
to problems, he had to act pragmatically due to the severe limi­
tations of American military power. No aid of that kind would be 
forthcoming.
Another— and far more important— area of Adams* moral con­
cern was Latin America. The fate of the new republics there 
would preoccupy him as President as it had preoccupied him as 
Secretary of State, when he formulated the Monroe Doctrine. His 
actions in this area were determined by a mixture of rationalist 
pragmatism, a characteristic of the thinking of Locke, in which 
primacy was placed upon commercial reciprocity, and a desire 
that America exercise a moral tutelage over the South American 
republics. This was to be accomplished by the projection over
the rest of the hemisphere of the coordinate state incorporated
23 8
into the American constitutional system. The Monroe Doctrine was 
to be universalized, and all European powers excluded. As Presi­
dent of the United States now, instead of merely Secretary of 
State, Adams had more power to attempt to carry out this pro­
cess. In a Lockean sense, he was motivated by an uneasiness in 
the form of the recognition of moral imperative. The greater the
uneasiness, the stronger the will, and it is the will that
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directs our operative faculties to some action. This action 
would involve the founding of an international state which would 
be, in effect, bound by the social compact of which the United 
States was the exemplar. The test of its legitimacy would not
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only be whether the new independent nations of Latin America 
accepted American tutelage, but also whether Spain, or the 
powerful nations of Europe, would succeed or fail in an attempt 
to reimpose a colonial state upon them. Adams conceived of this 
in starkly apocalyptic terms as a conflict between despotism
240
and constitutionalism which would settle the fate of the world.
In this effort the penetration of American ideas was cru­
cial. Consequently, as early as 1810 the United States govern­
ment had sent commercial agents to Argentina, which had 
recently begun to throw off Spanish rule. At the same time, the 
revolutionary governments in Latin America had sent agents to
the United States to plead for American recognition of their 
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independence. Early in 1822, partly because of the achievements
of the Spanish-American revolutionaries, and partly because of
the ratification of the Florida Treaty with Spain, Secretary of
State John Quincy Adams and President James Monroe felt that
conditions were at last propitious for the recognition of South
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American independence.
In the application of the rational to formulate this pol­
icy and to act, both moral and pragmatic ideas concerning the 
reactions of Spain and other European states, trade impera­
tives, the state of American military power, and so forth, were 
subjected, both individually and interactively, to a process 
involving the synthesizing of a mixed mode, an abstract concept 
of order. In a Lockean sense, the mind exercised an active 
power in combining a number of ideas, without examining whether 
they had existed together in nature, as long as they were con­
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sistent in the understanding. Such a synthesis would produce a 
vigorous and coherent framework of policy, effectively activa­
ted whenever there was confrontation with a challenging situa­
tion. This framework was the Monroe Doctrine, which Adams con­
tinued to uphold as President, and in which the new Latin Amer­
ican nations expressed interest, perhaps in order to lend moral 
sanction to their actions; almost certainly to seek protection 
for their fragile independence. Indeed, Colombia, Brazil, 
Argentina, and Mexico not only took a special interest in the
Doctrine; they also urged the United States to agree to mea-
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sures to insure respect for it.
These same Latin American nations continued to struggle
against Spanish rule, and by late 1825 the final remnants of
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that rule on the American continents had been destroyed. In
order to bring about a reasoned environment in which states
tacitly recognized by the United States as independent could be
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coevals in the state of nature, and to regain the diplomatic 
initiative because Great Britain had already officially recog­
nized Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia at the end of 1824, Adams
entered into a diplomatic effort which was designed to bring
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about Spanish recognition of the new republics. Here, his 
Anglophobia again asserted itself, but instead of manifesting 
itself as an assertion of an independent stance for the United 
States, it manifested itself as an assertion of an independent 
stance for Latin America. As long as these republics could be 
subservient to Britain, because of its vast naval and economic 
power, the nascent ideas defining the conscious national sense
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of selfhood of these nations would he subservient to the power
of Britain to invoke idea, much as the United States had been
during the years immediately following the American Revolution.
In this instance, the idea was "Britain, the most powerful of
nations". Since ideas are extracted from experience by reflect-
2^8
ion and sensation, and then projected beyond experience, the 
pursuit of aggressive policies by Britain in Latin America 
would militate against the creation of any mixed mode concept 
of national identity because such a process would cause the 
precluding, nolens volens, of certain actions and resultant 
experiences by the Latin Americans which would challenge Brit­
ish power. What is more, the crippling tutelage of Spain would 
serve somewhat the same function. For example, the South Ameri­
can states sometimes granted special favors and privileges to
2k9
Spain as the price of their recognition. Fear of Spanish power 
was still evident.
Anglo-American rivalry was thereby set, and confronta­
tions inevitably occurred. In Argentina, for example, Forbes,
the American Minister, waged a one-man battle for years to
250
thwart British commercial and political influence there. With
such considerations in mind, then, the United States government
negotiated a series of treaties with the Latin American states.
Their basis was to be unqualified reciprocity and most favored
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nation treatment. With this arrangement a ground of equanimity 
would provide the proper array of ideas for the mixed mode syn­
thesis of national identity--under American guidance. However, 
with the synthesis would come the "moral person", truly a
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coeval with the United States and all other nations, thereby-
eliminating the possibility of American, British, Spanish, or
any other conceptual or potential hegemony. The transcenden-
tally moral would triumph, and hence, what was at first both
moral and pragmatic would become exclusively moral. Such would
be the full realization of the potential of the ideas of
Locke. Accordingly, in 1825* when Adams became President, the
first United States legation in Spanish America was estab-
252
lished in Bogota, Colombia.
However, this desire to eliminate foreign hegemony was
not merely confined to the United States. Colombia and Mexico
looked at Cuba and Puerto Rico, and noticed that they were
still under Spanish rule. They thereupon prepared to launch
military expeditions to liberate them. Adams urged them to
desist, and to give time to Emperor Nicholas I of Russia and
his allies to persuade King Ferdinand of Spain to save those
islands by recognizing the independence of the Latin American 
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republics. In other words, the United States would be content 
to see the islands remain in Spanish hands. Colombia and Mex­
ico, if they had taken Cuba and Puerto Rico, would not have 
possessed sufficient military power to defend them. Thus,
other European powers besides Spain would have invaded those 
25^
islands, doubtless clothing their actions in moral terms.
In the event, another European power did attempt to move 
into Cuba, but not by means of military conquest. Canning, Bri­
tish Foreign Secretary, moved to prevent American domination of 
the Western hemisphere, though American and British policy— the
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prevention of entrance into Latin America by any third nation—
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for the time being, coincided. In Lockean terms, the abstract 
mixed mode concepts held by Britain and the United States, each 
being voluntary concatenations of simple ideas, profoundly dif­
fered. One was at once both pragmatic and moral, with these two 
components interacting with and modifying each other during 
modal formation; the other was merely pragmatic, mainly econo­
mic. Yet, the short-term concepts were paradigmatically united 
by immediate knowledge. This knowledge consisted of the fact 
that the French commander in the Caribbean had standing orders 
to assist Spain in defending Cuba and Puerto Rico. Accordingly, 
Secretary of State Clay invited Canning to join the United
States in declaring to the French that those two islands were
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not to be transferred to another European nation. Canning
rejected this offer, so great was his distaste for the United 
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States. His behavior may be thought of as having originated 
from a mixed mode compounded of his negative emotions concern­
ing America, ideas about Spanish weakness, French power, future 
commercial advantages for Britain in Cuba, and so forth. These
were the factors which, in Lockean terms, defined the type of
258
action which constituted a given instance of behavior. They 
would define Canning's behavior as he subsequently prepared to 
present a case against the United States at the Congress of 
Panama.
This great assembly was to be the great legitimizing
forum for American plans to place Latin America within its 
moral tutelage. So important was this to Adams that his Secre-
7^
tary of State, Henry Clay, was preoecupied with it for most of 
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his tenure. Having first been suggested by the Colombian Minis­
ter to the United States, Jose" Maria Salazar, in 182^, the idea
259
was eventually accepted by Adams after he became President. In 
practical terms, the Congress was to have the typical Lockean 
characteristics of the empirical and the moral. As Adams sta­
ted: " . . .  And lastly, the Congress of Panama is believed to 
present a fair occasion for urging upon all the new nations of
the South the just and liberal principles of religious 
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liberty . . . "  This utterance was in conformance with the Lock­
ean belief that the moral status of political societies derives 
from their capacity to serve as instruments for man's struggles
to discharge the religious assignments for which God had cre- 
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ated him— and it was in conformance with Adams' beliefs. These
took the form of a moral imperative, which his mother had
inculcated into him even as a child, as she urged him to always
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turn to religion. Religion, a collection of simple ideas which 
formed a mixed mode of moral symmetry, was to be the basis of 
moral action, particularly on an anthropocentric plane.
Somewhat secularized, this moral action concerning the 
interrelationship of man with man would also be interpreted as 
bringing Latin America within the purview of the Monroe Doc­
trine. Of course, from the American point of view, the Congress 
of Panama would reaffirm that tenet. At the same time, the 
northern press advocated a Pan-American Congress in order to
eliminate foreign commercial competition from potential Ameri-
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can trade with South America. Again, with the absorption of
75
this idea by the administrationf there was primacy placed upon 
the Lockean concept of pragmatism combined with morality. That 
is, commercial interests and the legitimization of an American 
moral imperium were both given high priority for the Congress, 
but by different interest groups, each rationally perceiving 
its interests.
At this point, the fate of the Congress must be depic­
ted. Originally, it was the idea of Simon Bolivar, who issued
a call for the Congress of Panama in a circular letter of Dec- 
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ember 7» 1824. Five months later, after invitations had been 
offered to the United States by the Ministers of Colombia and 
Mexico, Secretary of State Clay endorsed acceptance, and Adams 
authorized him to do so, stating that such a Congress "might 
be highly useful in settling several important disputed ques­
tions of public law, and in arranging other matters of deep 
interest to the American Continent, and to the friendly inter­
course between the American Powers . . . "  Adams subsequently 
nominated Richard C. Anderson, Jr., of Kentucky, and John Ser­
geant, of Pennsylvania, as ministers, and William B. Roches-
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ter, of New York, as secretary to the mission.
However, the announcement of American participation in
the proposed Congress drew fierce partisan criticism which
centered around the supposition that such participation would
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draw the United States into an "entangling alliance". It could 
be stated that there was a perception that the individuality 
of the moral person of the United States had to be preserved. 
By supposedly interacting with the ideas of the representa-
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tives of the Latin American republics, individuality would be
lost, because the mixed mode of ideas which defined the
national self would be conceptually compromised. The sense of
collective personal, i.e., national, identity, which is consti-
267
tuted by consciousness of self, would be obviated, the bounda­
ries of the self eroded. What is more, there would presumably 
arise the possibility of an alienation of future from past 
national consciousness as entangling involvement with other 
nations would bring about thoughts and actions perhaps congru­
ent with other national consciousnesses with their own unique 
mixed mode conceptualizations. In the words of Locke 1 "For it 
is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and 
actions that it is self to itself now, and so will be the same
self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions
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past or to come." Translating this into empirical terms, what 
was feared was a loss of national sovereignty, and a concomit­
ant loss of the clear perception of national interest.
The Congressional enemies of the Adams administration, 
led by the supporters of John C. Calhoun, therefore produced a 
report which called for pursuing commercial equality and mari­
time rights which would be realized through bilateral treaties 5 
leaving religious matters to the domestic policies of the indi­
vidual nationsj and deferring concern for the fate of other
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Spanish colonies in America until actual danger arose. These 
men were not willing to see any coalition of other nations 
force their interests upon the United States. More abstractly, 
these men attempted to undermine the very Lockean basis of
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American policy towards Latin America by limiting the legiti­
macy of the concept of moral order both spatially and tempo­
rally.
Nevertheless, Adams* appointments were confirmed by the
Senate, and the House of Representatives approved the appropri- 
270
tions. As it turned out, this was a Pyrrhic victory. The Con­
gress of Panama emerged as a sounding board for the anti-Ameri­
can propaganda dispensed by Canning*s agent there, Edward J. 
Dawkins, and the American plenipotentiaries did not arrive in
Panama until the Congress had adjourned, for the long Congres-
271
sional debate had delayed their departure. Dawkins therefore 
had an unimpeded opportunity to emphasize that Britain had 
refused to join the United States in advising Mexico and Colom­
bia not to invade Cuba, for example, and by this and other 
statements, to put the United States in the worst possible 
light, and to concomitantly enhance British prestige in Latin
27
America. British naval and commercial superiority did the rest.
Consequently, the Lockean relationship between idea and action
was never more clearly— and negatively— shown. According to
Locke, morality is the relationship of actions with rules of 
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moral good. Therefore, morality must be actively promulgated.
In order to be effected, principle cannot remain in an in vitro 
state. Nevertheless, Adams* caution and regard for Constitu­
tional law remained the rule in American policy throughout his 
27^
administration. There would be a Lockean balance between the 
moral and the pragmatic, and a dependence upon a humane law of 
nations, regardless of whether the idea and practice of it
78
could be successfully projected overseas.
John Quincy Adams, therefore, epitomized the moralistic 
and the pragmatic confluence of Lockean belief and action in 
his diplomatic career. Particularly relevant to his actions, 
and revealing a remarkable similarity to his own beliefs, were 
the concepts of Locke which involved moral order, the self, 
property, knowledge and thought. He synthesized these ideas, 
either deriving them from Locke, or developing them in a 
remarkable instance of parallel thought, into a powerful basis 
for action as a diplomat. They comprised, in effect, a uni­
verse of interpenetrating thought and action through which 
Adams was able to effect the empirical, and by that realize a 
large measure of self-definition and freedom, despite an often 
unsympathetic reality populated by politicians, diplomats, and 
others, both American and European.
Later, the Presidential administration of John Quincy 
Adams was, in foreign affairs, a function of his will. Again, 
it was a will which was at once both moralistic and pragmatic. 
On an even larger canvas he synthesized this into a mixed mode 
conceptualization which was used in formulating and effecting 
policies in regard to Great Britain, France, Greece, and the 
Latin American republics. Its Lockean corollaries involved the 
maintainance of that concept of self, whether defined by a 
continuing consciousness? thought and action? or knowledge, 
particularly moral knowledge. Intimately related to this was 
perhaps the supreme Lockean idea which John Quincy Adams 
embraced— the concept of the state as a condition of moral
79
order. With this, he was able to universalize and render corpo­
rate the Lockean synthesis and to apply it in a way which was 
consistent with both theoretical and practical considerations 
in regard to foreign policy.
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